The safety representative - an experiment in industrial democracy? - abandoned?? by Purves, Phil
	
	





 ! ∀#∃%
& ∋∋()
&∗	+,,−,.,
	
	
	
	
			
	
	
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
The Safety Representative
An experiment in Industrial Democracy?
- abandoned??
Phil Purves
Introduction
The introduction of two Statutory Instruments - the Health and Safety
(Consultation with Employees) Regs. 1996 No 1513 and the Merchant
Shipping and Fishing Vessels (Health and Safety at Work) Regs 1997 No
2962 - have made it necessary to review the responsibilities of the safety
representative, as those specified in these documents seemed to indicate a
significant change to the philosophy proposed in the Robens Report l and
inherent in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
This philosophy may be summarised in edited words from that report
as follows:
'Real progress in the promotion of safety and health at work is
impossible without the full co-operation and commitment of all
employees. If the new inspection approaches [proposed] are to work,
increasing reliance will have to be placed on the contribution that work
people themselves make towards safety monitoring. ,2
'...We regard the question ofworker involvement as quite central to this
enquiry and the main themes of our report... 03
'As we see it, an employee's safety representative... should have specific
duties... He should be empowered to carry out inspections... should have
Safety and Health at Wark - Report ofthe Committee 1970 - 1972, Lord Robens.
para 59.
para 64.
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access to and contacts with... safety inspectors. ,4
'In the development of new approaches to inspection work we attach
very great importance to more contacts and co-operation between
inspectors and work people and their representatives... ,5
The vision was that, from these regular contacts and co-operation, the
inspectors would become aware ofany shortcomings which would need to be
addressed in their consultations with employers. Nowhere did Robens
envisage that the time cost of these consultations could be overwhelming for
the Inspectors - or that employers might exhibit reluctance to implement their
obligations. Thus, persuasion rather than enforcement was encouraged -
although enforcement measures were recommended as a last resort.
The Health and Safety at Work Act, in its original form, implemented
these proposals almost exactly as summarised above.
The changes which have occurred to this approach have been
incremental but, in total, have produced significant differences in the
perceived 'status' of the representative. It could be argued that some result
from the implementation of European legislation, but it has always been
accepted that there is no European prohibition on exceeding the requirements
of their legislation, so any downgrading to those requirements is a political
decision.
A literature search undertaken initially revealed no material which
considered this approach, although R Akass expresses disappointment at the
implementation of the recommendations of the Robens Report. 6
The intention is, therefore, to explore how the legislation introduced
subsequent to this Act finally created this change in status and, if possible,
indicate why it may have occurred.
para 65.
para 213 - also paraphrased in para 66.
Akass R, What Every Manager needs to Know about Health and Safety, 1995, Gower, pp46 - 49.
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The Context
The ten years between 1965 and 1975 were a period of change in
industrial relations. The early part had seen the introduction of the era of
GovernmentlUnion consultation as a counterbalance to the previously
established GovernmentlCBI.
At the same time, the confrontations between unions and employers had
reached the stage of debilitating industry and, partly as a result of this, Barbara
Castle, as the minister responsible, had introduced a white paper 'In Place of
Strife' in which arbitration and responsibility were key elements. This was
withdrawn after being rejected by the General Secretaries of the major unions.
Shortly afterwards, the Conservatives gained power and tried to
implement an Industrial Relations Act which would have put unions on the
same legal footing as companies. This was rendered of no practical effect by
the unions' tactic of non-cooperation by refusing to register - in a similar way
as that required of companies, as required by that Act.
It was in this atmosphere that Lord Robens' Committee on Health and
Safety - set up to advise on the way in which all workers could be protected
at work - was deliberating on its report. This was delivered in 1972, and a
Health and Safety at Work Bill was prepared and put before Parliament. This
Bill fell when Parliament was dissolved in 1974, but was resurrected by the
new Labour Government, with minor Amendments, and passed in 1974.
The Philosophy
From the above comments on the Act, it may be recognised that it was
the result of a bi-partisan approach. It introduced a fundamentally different
concept to the implementation of health and safety in the workplace. Until this
time, there had been two philosophies - that associated with manufactories and
that associated with seafaring (which retained some of the pre-legislative
attitudes of employers).
The former was prescriptive, in that it identified particular dangers in
a workplace and legislated the requirement for employers to take certain
actions to eliminate these dangers. Much of the legislation was originally
targeted at particular industries with employers complaining, in each case, that
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implementation would bankrupt the industry concerned. 7 It should be noted
that this never occurred although, inevitably, a few poorly managed or
underfinanced businesses did go out of production. As time went on, many of
these individual pieces of legislation were consolidated into Factory Acts.
However, the scope of these was narrow. 8 This narrowness of scope was
broadened to include some other classes of worker by the Offices Shops and
Railway Premises Act 19639 but a large proportion of workers were still, at
that time, reliant only on Tortious Actions in Negligence for their protection.
The latter relied almost exclusively on the concept that the sea was a
dangerous environment and those working in it should be aware of this and
take care of themselves. To assist them to do this, there was a Code of Safe
Working Practices which was reinforced by a stream of advice, in the form of
'M' Notices, from the Government Department responsible for shipping. 10 The
'Safety' legislation, of which there was a plethora,11 was mainly concerned
with the continued existence of the ship and thus, with the exception of that
implementing the provisions of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, was
mainly concerned with protecting the owners' and shippers' investments.
The Health and Safety at Work Act was designed to sweep away all this
and introduce a single common system applicable to all classes of employee
(except seafarers!) in which both employers and employees were regarded as
rational beings who could work together for their mutual benefit. Underlying
this, though, was the intention that employees would be able to monitor and
influence the behaviour of 'irrational' employers. 12 This was to be achieved by
Sec eg Sir Llewellyn Woodward The Oxford History ofEngland. The Age ofReform 1815 1870, 2nd ed,
pp 149-156.
See Factories Act 1961 ss 172/4.
Seess 1/3.
10 Variously, The Board of Trade, Depm1ment of Trade, Department of Trade and Industry, and Department
of Transport.
11 See Marine Information Note 14 (M&F) - or its replacement - issued by the Marine Information Centre
which is part of the Marine Safety Agency. This lists around 140 relevant Statutory Instruments any of
which are supplemented by requirements specified in Merchant Shipping Notices - a form of 'tertiary'
legislation which is not even laid before Parliament (there are eWTently over 80 of these).
12 See Robens Report s 59
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the appointment of Safety Representatives13 who would be able to monitor the
safety policy of their firm and its proper implementation. [It should be noted,
in passing, that the scope of the Act extended well beyond the
employer/employee relationship; embracing almost all relationships within the
scope of a business's activities.]
The Safety Representative
1. Under the Act
In its original form, every business would have the obligation, made by
regulation, to recognise safety representatives and consult with them on
prescribed matters. It is worth noting the original words of the Act. 14
Even before the Regulations referred to above had been introduced,
subsection (5) had already been repealed by the reconfirmed Labour
Government (possibly as a result of union pressure to indicate that every
workplace should recognise a trade union and that therefore the section was
unnecessaryY 5 - thus placing all those businesses which, by reason of size or
philosophy, did not recognise a trade union outside the primary statutory
monitoring system of the Act. This is all the more surprising since there could
be a rational supposition that these might well be the very businesses which
would most need such monitoring!
What, then, are the functions ofthese representatives? This is indicated,
13 See s 2 of the Act and also Robens Report ss 65 & 66.
14 '2(4) Regulations made by the Secretary of State may provide for the election in prescribed cases by
recognised trade unions (within the meaning of the regulations) of safety representatives from amongst the
employees, and those representatives shall represent the employees in consultations with the employers
under subsection (6) below and may have such other functions as may be prescribed.
(5) Regulations made by the Secretary of State may provide for the election in prescnbed cases by
employees of safety representatives from amongst the employees, and those representatives shall represent
the employees in consultations with the employers under subsection (6) below and may have such other
functions as may be prescribed.'
15 See comments in Hansard 28 April 1975 at pp 74 and l56n and the general comments made during this
debate on the second reading of the Employment Protection Bill.
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in general terms, in subsection (6)16 and in order to facilitate this
communication, subsection (7)17 provides for the formation of a consultative
committee.
The functions of the safety representative, as subsequently determined
in the Regulations,18 are to:
'1. Consult with employers for promoting measures to ensure Health
and Safety and monitoring their effectiveness,
2. Investigate potential hazards and dangerous occurrences,
3. Investigate complaints on Health and Safety,
4. Carry out inspections in accordance with Regs 5, 6 and 7,
5. Consult with Health and Safety Inspectors,
6. Receive information from Health and Safety Inspectors,
7. Attend Safety Committee meetings.'
When properly implemented in an organisation, these regulations create
a consultative structure within which managers and workers work together
towards a common goal. 19 As this consultation becomes established within
the organisation and new lines of communication between management and
16 '(6) It shall be the duty of every employer to consult any such representatives with a view to the making
and maintenance of anangements which will enable him and his employees to co-operate effectively in
promoting and developing measures to ensme the health and safety at work of the employees, and in
checking the effectiveness of such measures.'
17 '(7) In such cases as may be prescribed it shall be the duty of every employer, if requested to do so by the
safety representatives mentioned in subsections (4) and (5) above, to establish, in accordance with
regulations made by the Secretary of State, a safety committee having the function of keeping under review
the measures taken to ensure the health and safety at work of his employees and such other functions as
may be prescribed.'
18 Regulations on Salcty Representatives and Safety Committees (SI No 500 of 1977).
19 See Robens (supra) S5 65, 66 and 70.
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workers develop, there is the opportunity for these to expand to encompass
other areas of mutual interest, with the result that general industrial relations
within the organisation are likely to change and should become less
confrontational.
Since such structures were foreign to most UK businesses of the 1970s,
there was, initially, considerable reluctance to implement them, and there are
still a number of small-to-medium size firms to which the concept is foreign.
It is this reluctance to change internal hierarchies which has proved stronger
than the enforcement measures available and implemented under the AceD and
which has, ultimately, with the reducing recognition of trade unions, led to the
dilution of the concept - as will be demonstrated.
2. At Sea
As has been noted above, seafarers were excluded from the provisions
of the Health and Safety at Work Act and it was not until 1982 that
Regulations were made under the authority of the Merchant Shipping Act
1979. The first of these was the MS (Safety Officials and Reporting of
Accidents and Dangerous Occurrences) Regs 1982 No 876. This was
introduced under the aegis of a Conservative Government and therefore,
presumably, after thorough consultation with the shipping industry. This
shows considerable deviation, in organisation, to the HSW Act and the
Regulations made thereunder concerning Representatives. The application was
to United Kingdom ships with certain exceptions - notably fishing vessels - in
which a crew of more than five were employed.
Reg 3 started by introducing an official who, while entitled by long
tradition in textbooks and the Robens Committee of Enquiry, had not hitherto
been nominated in legislation - the Safety Officer - and stated that the
employer shall appoint one (Reg 5 then defined his duties). Reg 3 then stated
that the officers and ratings may elect safety representatives and specified the
number of these in terms of numbers of personnel. The employer should make
rules for election and, where a representative was elected, the employer should
appoint a safety committee with the Master as chairman and safety officer and
representatives ex officio.
20 S5 18 - 26 and see Robens (supra) ss259 - 262.
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Regs 6 and 7 then defined the powers of safety representatives and
duties of safety committees while Reg 8 defined the duties of the employer
and Master. It is worthwhile summarising these as they were admirable in the
clarity with which the philosophy was annunciated within them and, with their
recent repeal, they may not be easily accessed now.
The safety representative was enabled to:
'I. Consult with the Master on safety matters and promote measures
for the occupational health and safety of the crew - including
recommending the suspension of work.
2. Carry out or participate, with the Safety Officer, in inspections.
3. Inspect records kept by the Safety Officer.
4. Request an investigation by the Safety Officer into any matter
which he believes may cause an accident.
5. Receive information of any dangerous cargoes on board, the
nature of the hazard, and the existence of any other hazard on
board, known to the employer or Master and which may endanger
ship or crew.
6. Be identified to the crew by posted notice.
7. Receive from the employer or Master, on request, information
about accidents and dangerous occurrences.
8. Receive, on request, any information or plans necessary to enable
the undertaking of investigations or inspections.'
Two points in particular could be noted in these MS Regulations. The
first was that the only grounds for non-disclosure were national security21 and
21 Reg 8, final sentence.
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Reg 8(2?2 in particular requires the sharing of information which many shore
businesses in chemical production or storage have regarded as company
confidential and withheld with very unfortunate results. The second was that,
under Reg 8(8),23 the safety organisation in the shore branch could make
decisions on recommendations from the shipboard safety committee without
any person on the decision making body having any first-hand appreciation of
the significance of the suggestion ( note the decisions made in re the Herald
of Free Enterprise concerning failsafe warning lights to the bridge as to
whether the bow doors were open or shut).24
Notwithstanding those points, the observation to be drawn from the
regulations quoted above was of a close-knit workforce working together for
their mutual and individual safety. This impression was, and is, frequently not
at variance with reality.
This somewhat unique approach has recently been changed by the
introduction of new regulations25 which repealed the above and tended to
approach the form and wording of the 'shore' requirements26 One
improvement is the introduction of the need for competent persons to be
appointed by the employer 'to provide such protective and preventative
services for the undertaking' (my italics) and which should counter the
situation extant in the Herald of Free Enterprise circumstance noted above.
However, the provisions of Reg. 8 (2),(6) and (8) have disappeared and,
although (6) is not of great importance, their removal suggests a message of
downgrading of co-operation which is re-emphasised in the omission of (8).
It should also be noted that the provision in 6(2)a) and 8(7) allowing the safety
representative to recommend that certain work should be suspended has been
omitted.
22 Which concerns employers' duty to provide the information stated in No 5 above.
23 Which required the employer or Master to speedy in writing the reasons for refusing to implement
suggested occupational health and safety measures. Note that these could come from the Safety Officer,
Safety Representative or Safety Committee.
24 Herald of Free Enterprise Formal Investigation Report of Court No 8074 para 18.
25 The Merchant Shipping and Fishing Vessels (Health and Safety at Work) Regulations 1997.
26 See Pa11s IV and V.
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3. In the Business Environment
Even where a trade union is recognised, the actual implementation of
the representative/committee structure with real communication and trust is
far from universal in application. There are cases where the representatives
find that committee recommendations are either ignored or are so amended
in the minutes as to leave a misleading impression for those holding decision
making powers who are frequently not on the committee.27
The situation in those organisations which do not recognise a trade
union and which were, until the beginning of this year, not required to have
either representatives or a committee was even worse. There was, not
infrequently, the suspicion that any member of the workforce who attempted
to bring a safety concern to the employer would be regarded as a troublemaker
and could find himself, in short order, without a job. Even where this was not
the case, the most recent general guidance on the employees, duties
concerning health and safety, which may be found in the Management of
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 Reg 12 states:-
'(2) Every employee shall inform his employer or any other
employee of that employer with specific responsibility for the
health and safety of his fellow employees -
(a) of any work situation which a person with the first-
mentioned employee's training and instruction would
reasonably consider represented a serious and immediate
danger to health and safety; and
(b) of any matter which a person with the first-mentioned
employee's training and instruction would reasonably
consider represented a shortcoming in the employer's
protection arrangements for health and safety.
insofar as that situation or matter either affects the health and
safety of that first-men(ioned employee or arises out of or in
27 Such infonnation is, by its nature, hearsay and not amenable to open verification - hut the author did
observe it to occur when acting as a representative
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connection with his own activities at work, and has not previously
been reported to his employer or to any other employee of that
employer in accordance with this paragraph. ,28
Since, in these cases, the employee will be unlikely to have received any
health and safety training beyond that considered by the employer as necessary
to do his work - and is equally unlikely to be acquainted with legislative
requirements - the narrow scope of these guidelines indicate that the employer
is at liberty to implement only what he wishes and can fulfil without attracting
the adverse attention of a HSE or EH Inspector. Furthermore, the employee
is not encouraged to report matters beyond his immediate working
environment and is not permitted to report again dangers which have already
been reported but on which no action has been taken. It will also be noted that,
in these regulations, there is no guidance given as to what action, if any, an
employer etc should take on receipt of any information!
This legislation therefore represents a considerable retreat from the
philosophy inherent in the earlier legislation towards the more traditional
attitude that managers manage and employees obey almost without question.
4. At Present
So, up to this point, the team building and communicative philosophy
inherent in the Health and Safety at Work Act was initially watered down by
Labour in response to its commitment to the unions, reached a high point
under the early Thatcher administration with the MS Regulations and,
thereafter, with the declining numbers of recognised trade unions and more
strictly imposed hierarchies in companies, subsided almost to tokenism as
exemplified in the Management Regs 1992.
A further light can be shed on this by the recently introduced Health and
Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 No 1513. The reason
for introducing this legislation, which seeks to cover those disadvantaged by
the repeal of the HSW Act s2(5), is stated to be a need to comply with rulings
of the European Court of Justice with respect to the Health and Safety
Framework Directive: That all workers should have the same rights of
28 My italics.
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consultation29 The regulation, strangely, then goes on not to reinstate section
2(5) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 but to create a new and
inferior set of rights for this group of workers. These are to be found in Regs
3 to 6. It is instructive to compare these with the 1977 and MS Regs above
which, one would have thought, sought to fulfil the same purpose.
'Reg3 Where there are employees who are not represented by
safety representatives under the 1977 Regs, the employer shall
consult those employees in good time on matters relating to their
health and safety at work and, in particular, with regard to -
(a) the introduction of any measure at the workplace which may
substantially affect the health and safety of those employees;
(b) his arrangements for appointing or, as the case may be,
nominating persons in accordance with Regs 6(1) and
7(1)(b) of the Management of Health and Safety at Work
Regs 1992;
(c) any health and safety information he is required to
provide to those employees by or under the relevant
statutory provisions;
(d) the planning and organisation of any health and safety
training he is required to provide to those employees by or
under the relevant statutory provisions; and
(e) the health and safety consequences for those employees
of the introduction (including the planning thereof) of new
technologies into the workplace.'
These may be directly compared with the functions of the representative
listed on page 3 - but note that, at this point, there is no mention of an elected
representative. Instead, in Reg 4, the employer is given the option either to
29 See Explanatory Note to the Regulations.
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consult all the employees directly or with employee-elected representatives -
in which case he must inform the employees of the names of the
representatives consulted and who they were representing.
The first point to note is the very restricted nature of the duties laid on
the employers in this context. The next is the vagueness of the requirements
for election of representatives. It is clear that the decision to consult with
representatives as opposed to the whole body of employees is the employer's.
No guidelines, however, are given as to the number of these representatives
or how the elections are to be organised or conducted, or as to how the
candidates are to be determined or, indeed, any comment as to their capability.
Reg 7, however, does make the employer responsible for ensuring any such
representative is provided with suitable training and that the employees are
informed of the names of the representatives with whom he is consulting.
Reg 6 then defines the functions of the representative (separate from the
consultation by the employer). He may:
'1. make representations to the employer on potential hazards
and dangerous occurrences at the workplace which affect,
or could affect, the group ofemployees he represents;
2. make representations to the employer on general matters
affecting the health and safety at work of the group of
employees he represents and, in particular, on such matters
as he is consulted about by the employer under Reg 3; and
3. represent the group of employees he represents in
consultations at the workplace with inspectors appointed
under section 19( I) of the Functions of Representatives of
Employees 1974 Act'
It is to be noted that the method and frequency of the consultation is
determined by the employer, and there seems to be no requirement for the
employer to maintain records of these consultations or to take them into
account in any way. Furthermore, the scope of responsibilities of the
representatives is very much narrower than those of other representatives (see
the italicised comments above).
This last point raises another potential difficulty for an employer who
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has some employees represented by a recognised trade union and others who
are not. An employer holding to the letter of the law could have two distinct
forms of consultation operating and, if a shipowner, three! In fairness, it is
likely that a business which recognises trade unions and is already operating
a Health and Safety system incorporating representatives most probably
already has an organisation in place for non-union representatives, and will
thus need, at most, to make only small changes to its existing system. lt is
equally unlikely that such a business would go out of its way to create the
cumbersome system I have envisaged.
Analysis of the Status of the Safety Representative During this Period
The Robens Report clearly envisaged the role of the employees'
representative in two lights. First, as a valuable resource of safety
understanding within the workplace and secondly as a link with the safety
inspectors. This latter function would appear to be fundamental, since the
inspector is envisaged to have, initially, an advisory role with an escalating
scale of sanctions to be used as necessary to ensure compliance with safe
practice. Given the small number of inspectors and their likely workload, the
feedback from the safety representatives would enable them to maximise the
efficiency of their activities. Although this was implied in the actual legislation
(safety representatives to have access to inspectors), it was interpreted to mean
that, if an inspector called, the representative should be entitled to consult with
him. This is a very different matter. It should also be considered that the
representative could be placed under pressure not to consult by the employer's
suggestion that the cost of further implementation of the 'rules' would have
implications which would affect jobs.
Further to this initial position, the eBI was opposed to a statutory
requirement to consult, preferring this to be left to the discretion of the
employer. 3o The initial Act, though, followed the Robens' recommendations
and made the appointment of representatives mandatory. Thus, initially, the
intention expressed in the Act was for all businesses to have representatives.
The functions of such representatives were to be determined by secondary
legislation (the Act being an 'enabling' one).
30 See Robens RepOJi s 64.
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However, even before these regulations were introduced, a key section
of the Act, which covered workplaces which did not recognise trade unions,
was repealed. This, at a stroke, removed statutory control from a significant
number of businesses - and thus the first line of monitoring in them as
envisaged by the Robens Report. Coterminously, it created a potential two tier
system.
At this time, as generally applies, shipping was still excluded from the
provisions except when within the general jurisdiction of the Courts
(essentially, when in port). Even then, the rules did not apply to crew, only to
those visiting the ship. The correction to this was to await regulation until
1982.
The system thus then created had until the introduction of the EC
inspired Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 to bed
down the required routines, including the rights of the Representative. It
would seem that, in enquiry after enquiry into accidents at work, the
businesses at fault had not - even a decade or more after the implementation
of the Act - set up safe systems of work with proper monitoring of their
effectiveness. The somewhat tardy introduction of the principles of the Act by
Merchant Shipping Regulation created a somewhat more mandatory system
which clearly spelled out the requirements for an effective system on board
ship. Unfortunately, this was not accompanied by a complementary system for
the shore part of the organisation - presumably because this was considered
to be covered by the Act. A consequence of this can be observed in the
Enquiry into the Herald of Free Enterprise.
Although the EC Directive merely establishes minimum requirements
and any country, in implementing them, is at liberty to exceed them, this was
not done by the UK which seemed to take the opportunity to dilute the
consultation between workers and employers. (This, of course, would be in
line with the evidence presented by the CBI to the Robens Committee.)
At about this time, the HSE started a campaign to persuade business of the
financial advantages of complying with the legislation31 and it would be
germane to ask why it took them nearly two decades to do this - and why it
31 eg, HS(G)96 - The costs of accidents at work. HS(G)lOl - The costs to the British Economy of work
accidents and work related ill health. HS(G) 137 - Health Risk Management: a practical guide for managers
in small and medium-sized enterprises. IND(G)208(L) - Be safe - save money - the costs of accidents: a
guide for small firms.
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should then have been considered necessary!
It was not until 1996 - and then under perceived pressure from the EC -
that the non-unionised workplace was again brought under the legislative
umbrella and a form of worker consultation was introduced. This, however,
was not only poorly drafted but left the chosen worker with little authority to
act beyond answering questions posed by his employerY Again, this seems
to have been in line with the cm evidence to the Robens Committee. It seems
interesting to note that there is little evidence from the implications of the
legislation that 18 years of the implementation of the Act had not resulted in
a change of approach - since many large firms, presumably members of the
cm, have now had long experience of satisfactory implementation.
The final change to the legislation is the repeal of the original MS
Regulations. Although additional legislative features have appeared since their
introduction, the changes in the sections dealing with the Representatives have
reduced their status - and this was not a requirement of the more recent
legislation. By emphasising the work-related nature of their rights, the
regulations have effectively removed their right to issue reports on, for
example, the safety of passengers (or implementation of the letter of the
regulations concerning their safety). The significance ofthis may only become
apparent if a cruise ship has a major incident.
This article has not attempted to explore the effectiveness of the
Representative, since this would be almost impossible to prove. The proof of
that lies in the results - ie a business with a well-organised health and safety
regime should - and probably does - save money compared to what it would
have expended if it had not been so organised. But such saving does not
appear in annual balance sheets so can hardly be demonstrated.
What the article has set out to demonstrate is that the concept of worker/
employer communication on a matter of mutual concern - as envisaged by the
Robens Enquiry - and the use of such representatives to communicate with the
Inspectors, as also so envisaged (and as originally implemented in the Act) has
been steadily attenuated in subsequent legislation.
A clear consequence of this is that, in the absence of witnesses to bad
32 As a peripheral issue, this resulted in a need to protect such a representative from 'unfair dismissal' arising
Ii-om attempts to fulfil his responsibilities, as he would not be covered by the protectIOn afforded to those
representatives fulfilling trade union activities. This was achieved in s100 of the Employment Rights Act
1996.
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practice, the work of the Inspector is greatly hampered, since the
recommended gradations of action against a non-compliant business would
occupy a disproportionate amount of time and effort on his part - assuming
that his random visits exposed the initial breaches. As a result of this, instead
of being able to act before the accident, he is usually reacting after it.
This, of course, is no consolation to the injured party who may not even
be able to take the relatively easy civil recourse of tort of breach of statutory
duty, since the inspector may, under the gradations of action and pressures of
time, decline to prosecute, and is reduced to pursuing that much more difficult
tort of proving negligence. Even there, the law may require him to sue a 'man
of straw'!
Of equal importance is the loss of opportunity for informed and
interested communication within the business with the accompanying
motivational consequences - notably a reduction in the confrontational nature
of much of industrial relations.
Phil Purves
Senior Lecturer
Southampton Institute
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